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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
On May 18, 2011, Plaintiff Barry Searcy, an inmate in the custody of the Idaho Department 
of Correction ("IDOC"), initiated the instant action by filing a Civil Complaint against the IDOC, 
the Board of Correction ("BOC") and various employees of the IDOC. Plaintiffs Complaint 
generally alleges that Defendants violated the constitution and laws of Idaho by charging inmates 
telephone sales commissions, commissary sales commissions, medical co-pay fees, photocopying 
fees and hobby craft surcharges.2 Plaintiff argued that absent legislation specifically and explicitly 
authorizing the collection of such fees, the IDOC may not impose them and that Defendants 
imposition of the subject fees invaded the province ofthe Legislature, which has the exclusive power 
to raise revenue, make lavv' and provide support for the State's penal institutions. The instant appeal 
is brought in connection with the Orders of the District Court denying Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R, pp. 000511-530; 
R, pp. 000726-737.) 
1To promote clatity and simplicity pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(d), this brief shall 
refer to the parties by the designations used in the trial court rather than "appellant" and 
"respondent." 
2Plaintiff's claims related to the hobby craft surcharge are not part of the subject matter of 
this appeal. 
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The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether the charging of user fees related to commissary 
purchases, telephone use, medical services and photocopy services invades the province of 
Legislature. Quite simply, the answer is no. The Board of Correction is the body that has been 
expressly granted the control, direction and management of the penitentiaries ofldaho, and Idaho's 
statutory scheme governing the State Board of Correction, Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code, contains 
a broad grant of authority to the Board of Correction to carry out its duties, which inherently 
encompasses the power to establish institutional programs and services for inmates and to develop 
methods for implementing the same. Ultimately, Plaintiffs complaint sterns from his voluntary 
decisions on how to spend his money; in exchange for his money, Plaintiff has received goods and 
the value of services rendered. Requiring Plaintiff to bear personal expenses that he is able to meet, 
and would be required to meet in the outside world, is both legal and appropriate. For these reasons 
and those set forth more fully herein, the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants should be affirmed. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Defendants agree with the course of proceedings set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the Idaho Department 
of Correction. (R, p. 000025 at if7.) The IDOC is the state government agency responsible for the 
incarceration and community supervision of felony offenders in Idaho. (R, p. 000313 at 'fl3; R, p. 
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000571 at ;r3.) The IDOC is an executive department of state government. LC. §20-201. A three-
member panel called the Board of Correction oversees the IDOC. LC. §§20-201, 20-201A. (R, p. 
000313 at ,I3; R, p. 000571 at ;r3.) The Board of Correction appoints a Director to serve as the head 
of the agency. LC. §§20-217A. (R, p. 000313 at i14; R, p. 000571 at i14.) The Director provides 
leadership, selects administrators and sets the strategic direction of the agency. LC. §§20-217 A. (R, 
p. 000571 at ,r4.) 
The IDOC manages and administers rules under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act 
("IDAP A"). (R, p. 000573 at ;rs.) A unique rule making process applies to the Idaho Department of 
Corrections as set forth in Idaho Code §20-212. (Id.) Pursuant to Idaho Code §20-212(1), the rules 
of the Board, as defined therein, are subject to review of the legislature pursuant to sections 67-454, 
67-5291 and 67-5292, Idaho Code, but no other provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure 
Act, Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code, apply to the Board, except as otherwise specifically provided 
by statute. (Id.) Thus, the Idaho Board of Correction is exempt from holding negotiated rule making 
meetings and public hearings. (Id.) 
The "Rules of the Board of Correction," which are promulgated pursuant to the unique 
rulemaking process set forth in Idaho Code §20-212, are found in IDAP A 06, Title O 1, Chapter O 1. 
(R, p. 000573 at ,I8.) Idaho Board of Correction IDAP A rules have the full force and effect oflaw 
and interpret, order and/or implement Idaho laws or IDOC policies, standard operating procedures 
or directives that affect the rights of the general public. (R, p. 000573 at ,rs; R, p. 000634.) BOC 
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IDAP A rules need not include statements concerning only the internal management of the 
Department that do not affect the rights of, or procedures available to, the general public. (R, p. 
000573 at ,is; R, pp. 000634-635.) See also Idaho Code §20-212(2). 
In addition to IDAP A rules, the IDOC manages and administers over 400 internal policies 
and procedures. (R, p. 000572 at 17.) IDOC policies serve as the official communication ofIDOC 
management philosophy regarding IDOC operations, practices and individuals under the authority 
of the Director of the IDOC and the Idaho Board of Correction. (R, p. 000572 at i!7; R, p. 000581.) 
standard operating procedures ("SOPs") provide instruction and/or step-by-step procedure for 
implementing an IDOC policy. (R, p. 000572 at i!7; R, p. 000609.) Unlike BOC IDAP A rules, IDOC 
policies and SOPs do not have the force and effect oflaw, though they do provide an !DOC-required 
course of action to follow. (R, p. 000572 at ,I7; R, p. 000581.) 
The operating budgets of individual state ofldaho agencies, including the Idaho Department 
of Correction, are established annually. (R, p. 000566 at i[6.) Appropriation acts establishing annual 
agency operating budgets are law, and the limits of those budgets cannot be exceeded. Id. The IDOC 
is funded primarily from the State General Fund. (R, p. 000316 at ,12; R, p. 000566 at ,I7.) Other 
funding sources include, but are not necessarily limited to, endowment income, cost of supervision 
fees, inmate labor, federal grants, and miscellaneous revenue. (Id.) 
The Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, which makes up part of the annual budget appropriated 
by the Legislature for the operation of the state correction system, includes money from the inmate 
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management fund ("IMF"). (R, p. 000316 at 114.) The IMF is made up of money that is collected 
by the IDOC and deposited in the state treasury. (Id.) The source of these monies includes, but is not 
limited to: telephone revenue; commissary revenue; vending revenue; laundry revenue; donation 
revenue; and social security revenue. (R, p. 000316 at ifl 4; R, p. 000361.) IMF money is deposited 
in the state treasury and is appropriated to the IDOC as part of its annual budget from the Idaho 
Legislature. (R, p. 000316 at iP 5.) There is no state law governing what expenditures can be made 
with IMF monies, and it is within the discretion of each IDOC facility how to spend its portion of 
the IMF. (Id.) 
As set forth in IDOC Policy 406 (Commissary Privileges and Services), the IDOC makes 
commissary services available to the incarcerated population. (R, p. 000317 at iP 7; R, pp. 000386-
388.) Commissary services provide inmates with the opportunity to purchase items that are not 
necessary for prison existence but approved for use by the IDOC. (R, p. 000317 at ifl 7; R, p. 
000388.) The Inmate Management Fund is partially comprised of funds from commissary revenue, 
which is the contractual sales percentage commission agreed upon by the IDOC and the commissary 
vendor. (R, p. 000362.) The revenue is calculated by taking gross commissary saies and subtracting 
the agreed upon percentage. (Id.) 
As set forth in IDOC Policy 503 (Use of Telephones by Offenders), it is the policy of the 
Board of Corrections to allow the use of telephones to inmates based on security needs and 
resources. (R, p. 000317 at ill 8; R, p. 0003 91.) The Inmate Management Fund is partially comprised 
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of funds from telephone revenue, which is the commission amount agreed upon by the IDOC and 
the telephone vendor. (R, p. 000361,) 
In addition to money from the inmate management fund, the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund 
is also comprised of money from photocopying fees and medical co-pay fees. (R, p. 000317 at 'iil 6; 
R, p. 000566 at 4J8.) As set forth in IDOC SOP 405.02.01.001 (Access to Courts), offenders have 
copying privileges subject to the following conditions: offenders (excluding indigent offenders) will 
be charged a fee of ten cents ($.10) per page for copies and page limitations on pleadings may be 
enforced in accordance with court rules. (R, p. 000317 at ,r16; R, p. 000373.) Fees charged for 
photocopying are deposited in the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund. (R, p. 000317 at ,r16.) 
Additionally, the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund is comprised of money from medical co-pay fees. 
(R, p. 000566 at ,rs.) As set forth in IDOC Policy 411 (Medical Co-pay), the Idaho Department of 
Correction and its contractors charge offenders incarcerated at IDOC facilities a co-pay for medical 
and pharmacy services, but do not deny access to medical, dental and mental health services when 
the offender does not have the resources to pay for such services. (R, p. 000318 at,rl 9; R, p. 000394; 
R, p. 000566 at ,I9.) Generally, an offender-initiated visit for sick cali service is assessed a medicai 
co-pay of five dollars ($5.00). (R, p. 000399; R, p. 000566 at ,r9.) A pharmacy service medical co-
pay fee of three dollars ($3 .00) per course/treatment or per prescription will be assessed to each 
offender patient who is dispensed over-the-counter or prescription medications. (R, p. 000400; R, 
p. 000566 at 4J9.) The money from photocopying and medical co-pay fees is deposited in the 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 6 
Miscellaneous Revenue Fund in the state treasury before it is ultimately appropriated back to the 
IDOC each year as part of its annual budget from the Idaho Legislature. (R, p. 000317 at ill 6; R, p. 
000567 at i!lO.) Medical co-pay funds deposited in the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund are used to 
offset General Fund medical expenses. (R, p. 000318 at ;p 9; R. p. 000399; R, p. 000567 at ill i .) 
For Fiscal Year 2012, for example, the Legislature appropriated $81,000 collected from inmates 
through medical co-payments for this purpose. (R, p. 000567 at i'11.) 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. STATEMENT OF ISSUES. 
Defendants contend that the primary issues presented to this Court are: 
1. Whether the District Court Correctly Determined That Defendants Did Not Invade 
the Province of the Legislature. 
2. Whether the District Court Correctly Granted Summmy Judgment for the 
Defendants. 
B. COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(5), 40, and 41, Defendants contend that they are 
entitled to an award of their costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. These contentions are 
supported by Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 31-3220A(16). See Argument, i,ifra, at Section V, sub-
paragraph D. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD REVIK\V. 
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. Rule 
56( c) provides in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter oflaw. 
"[T]he purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of trial where facts 
are not in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a conclusion of law which is 
certain." Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,444,690 P.2d 896, 899 (1984). 
"When reviewing an order for summar; judgment, the standard of review for this Court is 
the same stai1dard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion."Interrnountain Real 
Properties, LLC v. Draw, LLC, 155 Idaho 313,311 P.3d 734, 737 (2013). The Court will liberally 
construe all controverted facts in favor of the non-moving party and will draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of that party. Arreguin v. Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 
461, 180 P .3d 498, 500 (2008). If there is no genuine issue of material fact, there is only a question 
oflaw over which the Court will exercise free review. Jnfanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 47, 
44 P .3d 1100, 1102 (2002). "The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and [the] Court must evaluate each 
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party's motion on its own merits." Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. La. Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 
31 P.3d I 
' 
(2001J. 
This Court can affirm a grant of summary judgment on alternate grounds when a judgment 
on appeal reaches the correct conclusion but emolovs reasonirnr contrarv to that of this Court 
.... .... ..l. .., '-7 .,, 
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. RexM &Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208,218, 177 P.3d 955, 
965 (2008) ( citation omitted). Moreover, "it is well established that this Court will use the correct 
legal theory to affirm the correct decision of a district court even when it is based on an erroneous 
legal theory." JR. Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 120 Idaho 849,853,820 P.2d 1206, 
1210 (I 991) ( citation omitted). 
B. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. 
The matters before this Court involve the interpretation of Idaho's statutory scheme 
governing the State Board of Correction, Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code. This Court exercises free 
review over matters of statuto1yinterpretation. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326,327,208 P.3d 730, 731 
(2009). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to "derive the intent of the legislature." State v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 123,150 (2008). It is a well-established maxim of statutory 
interpretation that the Court "must consider all sections of applicable statutes together to determine 
the intent of the legislature." Ameritell Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium or Community 
Center, 146 Idaho 202,204,192 P.3d 1026, 1028 (2008). This starts with the "literal words of the 
statute," giving those words their plain, usual and ordinary meaning unless such meaning is contrary 
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to clearly expressed legislative intent or would lead to absurd results. Doe, 147 at 328, 208 P .3d at 
The Court should "'not deal m any subtle refinements of the leg1slat10n, but ... ascertam and 
give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word 
therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions." Payne, 146 Idaho at 575, 199 P.3d at 150. 
"When punctuation discloses a proper legislative intent or conveys a clear meaning the courts should 
give weight to it as evidence." State v. Nab, 112 Idaho 1139, 1141, 739 P.2d 438, 440 (Ct. App. 
1987) (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 
47.15 at 157 (4th ed. 1984)). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court "has long followed the rule that 
the construction given to a statute by the executive and administrative officers of the State is entitled 
to great weight and will be followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons fur holding 
otherwise." JR. Simplot Co., Inc., 120 Idaho at 854, 820 P.2d at 1211. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERL'\r1Ii~ED THAT DEFENDANTS DID 
NOT INVADE THE PROVINCE OF THE LEGISLATURE. 
The Board of Correction is the body that has been expressly granted the control, direction and 
management of the penitentiaries of Idaho. State v. Reese, 98 Idaho 347,348,563 P.2d 405,406 
(1977). Idaho Constitution, Article X, Section 5, mandated that the Idaho Legislature create a Board 
of Correction: 
The state legislature shall establish a nonpartisan board to be known as the state 
board of correction ... This board shall have the control, direction and management 
of the penitentiaries of the state, their employees and properties, and of adult 
probation and parole, with such compensation, powers, and duties as may be 
prescribed by law. 
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Pursuant to its constitutional mandate, the Legislature enacted Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code, 
which created the Board of Correction to control, direct and manage the Idaho's correctional 
facilities and to provide for the care and maintenance of all prisoners in its custody. See LC. §§20-
20 IA, 20-209(1 ). "The Board, with its constitutionally anchored control over prisons, paroles and 
probations, is recognized as an agency of the executive branch." lvlellinger v. !DOC, 114 Idaho 494, 
499, P.2d 1213, 1218 (Ct. App. 1988). See also I.C. §20-201 (stating the department of 
correction shall be an executive department of state government). The Board's prescribed powers 
include, but are not limited to, the power to make all necessary rules to carry out its duties, LC. §20-
212; the power to appoint a director of correction as the chief administrative officer for the Board 
and business manager who shall assume all the authority, powers, functions and duties as may be 
delegated to him by the board, LC. §20-217 A; and the power to make and adopt such rules and 
regulations for the government and discipline of the correctional facility as they may consider 
expedient, LC. §20-244. 
Thus, it is the executive branch, not the legislative or judicial branches, that is responsible 
for the control, direction and management of Idaho's correctional facilities. See Burge v. State, 90 
Idaho 473,476,413 P.2d 451, 452-53 (1966) ("[T]he supervision and maintenance of prisons is a 
function of the executive branch of the government, and ... in the State ofldaho the State Board 
of Corrections is the body which has been expressly granted the control, Idaho Constitution, Art. X, 
Sec. 5; LC. s 20-209; and ... the courts do not have jurisdiction to supervise matters of ordinary 
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prison discipline."). Accordingly, Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code, contains a broad grant of 
uulhunty Lu lht: Bmml uf Currection including to make all necessary rules to carry out its duties and 
to make and adopt such rules and regulations for the government and discipline of the correctional 
facility as they may consider expedient. I.C. §20-212; I.C. §20-244. "[T]he State Board of 
Correction exercises its constitutional and statutory authority through the instrumentality of the 
Department of Correction." Idaho Dept. of Correction v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 680, 690, 8 P 3d 675, 
685 (Ct. App. 2000). Despite this broad grant of power, Plaintiff argues that the policies and 
procedures put in place by the IDOC and which impose medical co-pay fees, photocopy fees, 
telephone commissions and commissary sales commissions are a violation of the separation of 
powers between the executive and legislative branches of the state government pursuant to Idaho 
Constitution, Article II, Section 1. Article II of the Idaho Constitution is titled Distribution of Powers 
and provides: 
§ 1. Departments of government 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of 
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, 
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that the imposition of the subject fees violates the separation of powers 
doctrine of the Idaho constitution because it intrudes upon the Legislature's power to raise revenue, 
support the State's penal institutions, and make law. As set forth more fully below, the District Court 
correctly determined that the fees at issue are not a violation of the separation of powers between the 
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executive and legislative branches of state government pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article II, 
Section L 
part: 
1. The District Court Correctly Determined That The Fees at Issue Are Not 
Unconstitutional Taxes. 
Article VII3 of the Idaho Constitution is titled Finance and Revenue and provides in pertinent 
§ 2. Revenue to be provided by taxation 
The legislature shall provide such revenue as may be needful, by levying a tax by 
valuation, so that every person or corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its property, except as in this article hereinafter otherwise 
provided. The legislature may also impose a license tax, both upon natural persons 
and upon corporations, other than municipal, doing business in this state; also a per 
capita tax: provided, the legislature may exempt a limited amount of improvements 
upon land from taxation. 
§ 16. Legislature to pass necessary laws 
The legislature shall pass all laws necessary to carry out the provisions of this article. 
Admittedly, the Board of Correction does not have the authority to levy taxes. However, the 
fees at issue are not taxes. "[A] fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to the particular 
consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs." Potts 
Construction Company v. North Kootenai Water District, 141 Idaho 678, 681, 116 P .3d 8, 11 (2005) 
3While Plaintiff claims in his Appellant's Brief that he is not appealing the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of IDOC as to his Article VII, § §2 and 16, these issues are 
necessarily subsumed within his argument that the IDOC violated the separation of powers between 
the executive and legislative branches of state government pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article 
II, Section 1. 
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(citation omitted). It cannot be disputed that the subject fees are assessed based upon an inmate's 
individual consumption and use; an inmate will not be charged a telephone commission, a 
commissary commission, a medical co-pay fee or a photocopy fee unless he utilizes telephone 
services, purchases commissary items or seeks medical or photocopy services. In this regard, it 
should be noted that an inmate will not be denied access to medical, dental and mental health 
services if he does not have the resources to pay for such services nor are indigent inmates charged 
photocopy fees. Thus, inmates such as Plaintiff, who have the ability to pay, make their own 
decisions to make telephone calls, purchase commissary items, photocopy documents or obtain 
medical services. In exchange for paying the subject fees, these inmates receive the value of services 
rendered. 
Moreover, taxes are primarily revenue raising measures. Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 
Idaho 502, 504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1989). It is apparent that the challenged fees do not constitute 
impermissible taxes as they are not a forced contribution for revenue raising purposes. To the 
contrary, the fees are voluntary and based upon individual consumption and use. The funds raised 
incidentally to the provision of extra goods and services to inmates are ultimately appropriated back 
to the IDOC for IDOC use. (R, p. 000316-318; R, p. 000566-567.) A fee does not become an 
unconstitutional tax merely because it provides incidental revenue. See id; see also Foster's, Inc. v. 
Boise City, 63 Idaho 201,118 P.2d 721, 728 (1941) (stating: "The fact that the fees charged produce 
more than the actual cost and expense of the enforcement and supervision is not an adequate 
objection to the exaction of fees."). 
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The fees at issue are more properly characterized as "user fees." Unlike a tax, a user fee is 
charge designed as compensation for the use of Government-supplied services, facilities or 
benefits." US. v. US Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363, 118 S.Ct 1290, 1292 (1998). The District 
Court correctly determined that each of the fees in question is a charge which is designed as 
compensation for the use of government supplied services or benefits, such as medical care and 
pharmacy services and photocopying supplies and services, and therefore, constitute user fees not 
taxes. (R, p. 000736, LL. 6-12.) See also Vance v. Barret, 345 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(finding a fee charged for the creation and maintenance of inmate trust accounts was allowable as 
a reasonable user fee imposed for the reimbursement of the cost of government services). 
2. The District Court Correctly Determined That The Funds Necessary to Support 
the State's Penal Institutions Need Not All Be Sourced From Revenue Provided 
By Taxation. 
Article X of the Idaho Constitution is titled Public Institutions and provides in pertinent part: 
§ 1. State to establish and support institutions 
Educational, reformatory, and penal institutions, and those for the benefit of the 
insane, blind, deaf and dumb, and such other institutions as the public good may 
require, shall be established and supported by the state in such manner as may be 
prescribed by law. 
"Section 1, article 10, is a direction to establish the institution, and authorizes state support, but does 
not make such support exclusive nor prescribe how or from what sources the necessary funds shall 
be obtained, but leaves that to the Legislature." State v. Johnson, 50 Idaho 363,368,296 P. 588, 589-
90 (I 931) ( emphasis added). In this regard, it is significant that the funds raised incidentally to the 
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provision of services to inmates in the instant case are ultimately appropriated back to the IDOC by 
the Legislature for IDOC use. (R, p. 000316-3 I 8~ R, p. 000566-567 .) 
The operating budget of the Idaho Department of Correction is established annually. (R, p. 
000566 at ,I6.) The Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, which makes up part of the annual budget 
appropriated by the Legislature for the operation of the state correction system, includes money from 
the inmate management fund, which is comprised, in part, of money from telephone revenue and 
commissary revenue, as well as money from medical co-pay and photocopy fees. (R, p. 000316 at 
ill 4.) Both IMF money and monies from photocopying and medical co-pay fees are deposited in the 
Miscellaneous Revenue Fund in the state treasury before ultimately being appropriated back to the 
IDOC each year as part of its annual budget from the Idaho Legislature. (R, p. 00316-318; R, p. 
000566-567.) Thus, the Legislature eventually appropriates monies from the subject fees to the 
IDOC. (Id.) In light of the same, it cannot be said the collection of such fees is unauthorized. 
The District Court correctly found that the funds necessary to support the penal institutions 
of the State need not all be sourced from revenue provided by taxation. (R, p. 000735, LL 22-24.) 
Pursuant to Article X, Section 1, "[t]he policy is that there shall be state institutions, the manner of 
establishment and support thereof by the state to be as prescribed by the Legislature, and state 
support may come from many sources." Johnson, 50 Idaho at 368, 296 P. at 589-90. Any monies 
raised incidentally from the subject user fees are deposited in the state treasury; it is the Legislature 
that appropriates these funds to the IDOC each year as part of its annual budget. (R, p. 000316-318; 
R, p. 000566-567.) Thus, the IDOC is not invading the province of the Legislature, as it is the 
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Legislature that ultimately prescribes the support of the IDOC through the budget and appropriations 
process. 
3. The District Court Correctly Determined That Defendants Did Not Exceed The 
Scope of Their Authority. 
The Board of Correction does not dispute that the power to make "law" lies exclusively 
within the province of the legislature. See Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660,664, 791 P2d 410,414 
(1990). However, the policies and procedures that impose the fees at issue are not "laws" but 
regulations relating to the internal management of the IDOC. "Such authority to make rules and 
regulations to carry out an express legislative purpose or to effect the operation and enforcement of 
the same is not exclusively a legislative power, but is administrative in its nature." State v. Heitz, 
Idaho 107, 112,238 P.2d 439, 442 (1951). 
The Board of Correction is the body that has been expressly granted the control, direction and 
management of the penitentiaries ofldaho. Reese, 98 Idaho at 348, 563 P.2d at 406. "Idaho Code 
20-212 and 20-244 empower the State Board of Correction to make and adopt rules and regulations 
for the efficient management of prison administration and discipline." Waggoner v. State, 121 Idaho 
758, 760 n. 3, 828 P.2d 321,323 (Ct. App. 1991). Notwithstanding, Plaintiff contends that because 
there is no direct provision in Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code, permitting the IDOC to collect 
commissions or assess monetarJ charges for goods provided and services rendered to inmates it has 
no authority to do so. Plaintiff essentially argues that the omission of a provision specifically 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 17 
allowing correctional facilities to charge user fees for goods and services provided to inmates evinces 
a l,;;;gisbti vc; rnkut tu pwlubit lr1c; d1mgmg of :such foe:s. 
However, the absence of express, specific provisions allowing the BOC to charge inmates 
phone and commissary commissions, medical co-pay fees and photocopying fees does not mean it 
lacks the authority to do so. To the contrary, the BOC has been granted broad authority to control, 
direct, manage and govern Idaho's correctional facilities, which inherently encompasses the power 
to establish institutional programs and services to inmates and impose user fees to offset costs. See 
Idaho Const. Art. X, Sec. 5; LC. §20-201, et seq. Plaintiff has not identified any provision 
prohibiting the challenged conduct nor has he offered any persuasive arguments why the power to 
impose such fees cannot be naturally implied from the BOC's statutory authority. "It is a well-
recognized rnle of law that, if a board is charged with a specific duty and the means by which the 
duty is to be accomplished are not specified or provided for, the board so charged has the implied 
power to use such means as are reasonably necessary to the successful performance of the required 
duty." Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311,321,341 P.2d 432,438 (1959) (citation omitted). Instructive 
in this regard is the holding of the Idaho Supreme Court that the Idaho Transportation Department 
CITD") had implied authority to issue a conditional permit despite the absence of express authority 
to do so. Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 442-43, 247 P.3d 666, 669-70 (2011). In that case, the 
Court found that the power to determine when and how a developer may build an encroachment is 
implied from the ITD's authority to regulate the design of public highways. Id. at 443, 247 P.3d at 
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670. In reaching this determination the Court noted: "Since the Legislature cannot possibly foresee 
all the practical difficulties that state agencies will encounter while carrying out their statutory 
functions, 'administrative agencies have the implied or incidental powers that are reasonably 
necessary in order to carry out the powers expressly granted."' Id at 442,247 P.3d at 669 (citing 2 
Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law §57 (2004)). See also Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 
239,207 P.3d 963, 970 (2009) (holding that "the power to impose certain specific conditions upon 
an application for an encroachment permit, including ... provision of bonds and construction of 
traffic signals, is within the scope of the legislature's grant of authority to ITD to regulate the safe 
use of and access to controlled access highways."). 
Like the ITD, the Board of Correction has the inherent power to use such means as are 
reasonably necessary to the successful performance of its duties. The Legislature could not possibly 
foresee all the practical difficulties faat the BOC would encounter in controlling, directing, managing 
and governing Idaho's correctional facilities, and so the Board was granted broad authority to carry 
out its duties. Necessarily encompassed within the Board's authority is the ability to establish 
institutional programs and services to inmates and to develop methods for implementing the same. 
Otherwise, the Board would be unable to effectively govern the State's correctional facilities or care 
for the inmates in its custody, preventing it from fulfilling its constitutional and statutory mandate. 
The reasoning of the Court in Vickers is especially persuasive in the instant case when one 
considers the incredibly difficult and complicated undertaking that the BOC has been tasked with 
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in governing and managing Idaho's correctional facilities. It is well-established that the Court must 
grant deference to the informed discret10n 0f 1,;u11cdw11al uffi1:1ab a::s '"pn::suu aJmmislraturs ... , 
and not the courts, (are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations." Turner 
v. Safley, 482 US 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-61 (1987) (citation omitted). Accordingly, even if 
a prison regulation impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights, it will be valid if it is reasonably 
related to legitimate penological interests. See id. The United States Supreme Court has explained 
the rationale behind this standard: "Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an 
inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems 
and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration." Id. 
The great deference afforded prison administrators is illustrated by the numerous court 
decisions that have upheld fees similar to the ones challenged in the instant case despite the fact that 
the fees were not explicitly authorized by statute. For example, in Tillman v. Lebanon County 
Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410,423 (3 rd Cir. 2000), the Third Circuit held that prison officials 
could deduct monies from inmates' accounts to recover some of the costs of their imprisonment 
despite the fact that there was no statutory authority for the same. In this regard, the Court stated: 
"Although we have not uncovered a statute explicitly providing for the deductions at issue here, the 
Cost Recovery Program was duly promulgated, not by the state, but by the county prison board, 
which has 'exclusive[]' authority regarding 'the government and management of the facility."' Id. 
(citation omitted). Likewise, in Olmos v. Ryan, No. CV 10-2564-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 4602517, 
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at *5-6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2013) (not reported in F.Supp.2d)4, the United States District Court for 
th.;; Di5trid uf A11Luua 1.;u11dw.h:J Llmt lhe Director of the Anzona Department of Correcnons 
("ADC") did not need express statutory authority to charge inmates for postage, photocopies and 
other items. Rather, the Court found that the "policies in question can be reasonably implied from 
'a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole' because they relate to the operations of ADC 
and administration of programs within the ADC." Id. at *6. See, e.g., Williamson v. Northampton 
County Prison, No. 12-2333, 2012 WL 1656291, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012) (not reported in 
F.Supp.2d) (finding the fact that a policy charging inmates for room and board is not grounded in 
statute does not establish it is illegal and the complaint did not suggest that the program was not 
properly authorized by the board of inspectors ofN orthampton County Correctional Facility or some 
other appropriate authority); Barney v. Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders, No. 08-4115, 
2009 WL 5103206, at *7 (D. NJ. Dec. 17, 2009) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) (holding the Board's 
resolution charging prisoners a daily user fee did not constitute an ultra vires illegal act in the 
absence of an express user fee statute because the Board had been expressly granted broad authority 
to "prescribe the rules and regulation for the management and conduct [ of county correctional 
facilities]"); In re Hamilton, 41 Cal.App.4th 926,933, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 845 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
4Defendants cite to unreported opinions in this section, not as binding precedent or authority, 
but as examples of how other courts have dealt with issues similar to those presented to this Court 
on appeal. See Staff of the Idaho Real Estate Commission v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630,634, 22 P.3d 
105, 109 (2001) (finding consideration of an unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as 
an example, appropriate). 
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(although none of the subject statutes specifically authorized a surcharge on handicraft materials, 
such authority was manifest based on the broad discretionary power vested in the director of 
Corrections and the legislature's intent that the handicraft program be self-supporting); Allah v. 
Coughlin, 190 A.D.2d 233,237 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding the imposition of a high school 
equivalency examination fee falls within the broad grant of authority given to the Commissioner of 
Correctional Services to operate the prison system, including fiscal management). This Court should 
follow the lead of the numerous courts from various jurisdictions that have not "seen barriers to the 
promulgation" of policies such as those complained ofby Plaintiff in the instant case. See Tillman, 
221 F.3d at 423. 
By statute and constitutional provision, the Idaho Board of Correction is vested with the 
power to control, direct and manage Idaho's correctional facilities, and the establishment of policies 
that impose user fees for goods provided and services rendered in order to offset the costs of the 
same is well within the ambit of its authority. The Board ultimately derives its power to control, 
direct and manage Idaho's correctional facilities from Article X, Section 5 of the Idaho Constitution. 
See Mellinger, 114 Idaho at 499, 757 P.2d at 1218. Reflecting the constitutional mandate of Article 
X, Section 5, Idaho Code §20-209 states in pertinent part: 
The state board of correction shall have the control, direction and management of 
such correctional facilities as may be acquired for use by the state board of correction 
and all property owned or used in connection therewith, and shall provide for the 
care, maintenance and employment of all prisoners now or hereinafter committed to 
its custody. 
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Idaho Code §20-209(1). In light of the clear grant of authority to the BOC to control and manage 
Idaho's correctional facilities and to provide for the care and maintenance of all prisoners in its 
custody, it cannot be said that Defendants infringed upon the province of the legislature in 
developing procedures related to the provision of institutional programs, activities and services to 
inmates, i.e. telephone services, commissary services, medical services and photocopy services. 
Significantly, Plaintiff is not arguing that the Board of Correction does not have the authority to 
provide inmates the opportunity to use the telephone, purchase commissary items, seek medical 
treatment or photocopy documents. Thus, Plaintiff would seem to agree that, though there are no 
direct statutory provisions permitting it to do so, the Board clearly has the authority and the 
responsibility to provide institutional programs, activities and services to inmates. Plaintiff simply 
disagrees with the Board's implementation of the same. However, the actions of the IDOC in this 
regard clearly relate to the management and care ofldaho's correctional facilities and those in its 
custody and are a proper exercise of the powers conferred by Article X, Section 5. In fact, as the 
Idaho Constitution confers on the Board of Correction, not the Legislature, the management and 
control of the state's penitentiaries, "the Legislature has not the power to take from that board the 
management and control of that institution, or make any mles and regulations for the government 
of the board that would in any way interfere with the efficient management and control of that 
institution." Akley v. Perrin, 10 Idaho 531, 79 P. 192, 192 (1905). 
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Thus, Idaho Code §20-212, which grants the authority to make "all necessary rules," as 
defined in that section, to carry out the provisions of Chapter 2, Title 20, is not the sole source of the 
Board of Correction's authority. Idaho Code §20-212 does not diminish or abridge the Board's broad 
authority to manage and control Idaho's correctional facilities, which is a constitutionaily anchored 
power, it merely brings the Board's rulemaking under legislative purview and protection. Prior to 
its amendment in 1999, Idaho Code §20-212 did not provide any procedure for rulemaking nor did 
it contain a definition of "rule."5 The legislative Statement of Purpose relating to amending Idaho 
Code §20-212 to provide that the rules of the Board of Correction and the Department of Correction 
be made in accordance with certain procedures, to define "rule," and to provide for legislative review 
of the rules states in pertinent part: 
[T]he Department of Correction is the only executive branch agency that is not 
required to follow the Administrative Procedures Act (AP A) when adopting 
procedural rules ... This bill would give the Department the same protection for 
policy development and rule making that other state departments have by bringing 
their rule making under legislative purview. In order to exclude inmate complaints 
and other sensitive issues, this bill requires that procedural rules be brought before 
the germane committees of the Legislature for review and approval, like other state 
agencies, but exempts them from the other provisions of Chapter 52. 
5The prior version was titled "Rules and regulations - Authority of board," and provided: 
The state board of correction shall make all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the 
provisions of this act not inconsistent with express statutes or the state constitution. They 
shall fix the time and place of meetings, the order of business, the form of records to be kept, 
the reports to be made, and all other regulations necessary to the efficient management and 
control of the state penitentiary and all properties used in connection therewith. 
Idaho Code §20-212 (1998). 
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1999 Idaho Laws Ch. 311 (S.B. 1110). Thus, the legislative historj ofldaho Code §20-212 suggests 
that it was amended to protect the Department of Correction in the exercise of its rulemaking 
authority, not curtail it. Notably, in order for an agency "rule" to have the "force and effect oflaw, 
it must be promuigated according to statutory directives for ruiemaking. Asarco Incorporated v. 
State, 138 Idaho 719, 723, 69 P.3d 139, 143 (2003). 
Pursuant to the plain language ofldaho Code §20-212, the procedures set forth therein are 
only applicable with respect to the "rules" of the board, which are defined as follows: 
(2) "Rule" as used in this section means the whole or a part of the board of correction 
or department of correction's statement of general applicability has been 
promulgated in compliance with the provisions of this section and that implements, 
interprets or prescribes: 
(a) Law or policy; or 
(b) The procedure or practice requirements of the board or department. The 
term includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule, but 
does not include: 
(I) Statements concerning only the internal management or internal 
personnel policies of an agency and not affecting private rights of the public 
or procedures available to the public; or 
(ii) Declaratory rulings issued pursuant to statute or the board's rules; or 
(iii) Intra-department memoranda; or 
(iv) Any written statements given by the department or board which pertain 
to an interpretation of a rule or to the documentation of compliance with a 
rule. 
Idaho Code §20-212(2) (emphasis added). This definition mirrors the definition of"rule" found in 
the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. LC. §67-5201 (19). Idaho Board of Correction IDAP A rules 
have the fall force and effect of law and interpret, order and/or implement Idaho laws or IDOC 
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policies, standard operating procedures or directives that affect the rights of the general public. (R, 
p. 000573 at f18; R, p. 000634.) BOC IDAPA need not include statements concerning only the 
internal management of the Department that do not affect the rights of, or procedures available to, 
the general public. (Id.) See also Idaho Code §20-212(2). Those statements are set forth in IDOC 
policies and procedures. (R, p. 000572 at f17; R, p. 000581; R, p. 000609.) Unlike BOC IDAPA 
rules, IDOC policies and SOPs do not have the force and effect oflaw, though they do provide an 
!DOC-required course of action to follow. (Id.) 
Prior to Plaintiff initiating the instant litigation, the IDOC procedures imposing the fees at 
issue in this case were not promulgated in accordance with the procedures set forth in Idaho Code 
§20-212 because they concern only the internal management of the IDOC and do not affect the 
private rights of or the procedures available to the public. Thus, they are not "rules" as defined in 
Idaho Code §20-212(2) and not required to be promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking procedure 
set forth therein. Compare with Service Employees International Union, Local 6 v. Frank, l 06 Idaho 
756,759,683 P.2d 404,407 (1984) (finding Depai1ment's agency handbook "must be construed as 
merely an internal guideline capable of being changed by an agency head, when necessary, not 
having the force and effect oflaw, and thus not giving rise to a cause of action based on an alleged 
violation."). 
That the IDOC promulgated ID APA rules setting the IDOC fee structure, including the photo 
copying and medical co-pay fees, during the pendency of this litigation does not reflect that these 
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fees were necessarily subject to the rulemaking procedures ofldaho Code §20-212 and this cannot 
be considered as proof of culpable conduct. See I.R.E. 407. Notably, the District Court did not decide 
whether the fees at issue constituted a matter of law or policy or a matter concerning the internal 
management of the IDOC. (R, p. 000734, LL. 17-20.) Because Piaintiffs ciaim was for deciaratory 
judgment, the District Court instead found that the promulgation of IDAP A rules subject to 
legislative oversight during the pendency of this matter constituted a remedial action that addressed 
any possible concerns regarding the separation of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches of state government and mooted any claims under Idaho Code §20-212. (R, p. 000734-735, 
LL. 21-24, 1-2.) \Vhile Defendants agree that this "remedial action" removes any possible 
controversy and renders Plaintiffs claims for declaratory judgment moot, they disagree with 
Plaintiffs suggestion that he would be entitled to damages for the revenue raised prior to the IDAP A 
rules going into effect. Such a notion presupposes that the IDOC procedures imposing the fees at 
issue in this case were required to be promulgated pursuant to the procedure set forth in Idaho Code 
§20-212, which Defendants dispute. 
Significantly, Idaho Code §20-244, which empowers the Board to make and adopt rules and 
regulations for the government and discipline of the correctional facility, does not indicate that such 
"rules and regulations" are subject to legislative review or indicate that the procedure in Idaho Code 
§20-212 is applicable. Notably, the definition of"rule" found in Idaho Code §20-212 only applies 
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to the term as used in that section. LC. §20-212(2). Idaho Code §20-244, titled Government and 
discipline of the correctional facility--Rules and regulations, states in its entirety: 
The state board of correction shall make and adopt such rules and regulations for the 
government and discipline of the correctional facility as they may consider expedient, 
and from time to time, change and amend the same as circumstances may require. A 
printed copy of the rules and regulations shall be furnished to every officer and guard 
at the time he is appointed, and so much thereof as relates to the duties and 
obligations of the convicted persons shall be given to the convicted person upon 
reception at the state's correctional institutions. 
Thus, the rules and regulations adopted under Idaho Code §20-244 are not conditioned upon 
legislative review but rather can be adopted by the Board and changed and amended as 
circumstances require. As such regulations are not required to be promulgated according to the 
statutorJ directive for rulemaking they would not have the "force and effect of law" but would 
provide an IDOC-required course of action to follow. 
In support of his argument that the IDOC does not have the authority to charge user fees, 
Plaintiff relies on Smith v. lwrida Department of Corrections, 920 So.2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005). In Smith the District Court of Appeal of Florida held that a fee charged for photocopying 
services by the Department of Corrections to inmates was not supported by a specific grant of 
legislative authority, which was required under Florida law, and was therefore invalid. Id. at 643. 
In that case, the Court found that Florida's statutory scheme governing the DOC did not "authorize 
the Department to make monetary assessments; it simply authorize[ d] the Department to collect 
monetary assessments." Id. at 641-42 ( emphasis in original). In concluding that the Department did 
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not have the power to impose the copying fee, the Court noted that the Florida legislature had 
enacted specific legislation authorizing the Department to collect medical copayments from inmates. 
Id. at 642. The Court reasoned that this provision would have been unnecessary had the legislature 
intended to grant the DOC unbridled discretion to charge an inmate for any services rendered. Id. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Smith, which was based on Florida's statutory scheme governing the 
Florida DOC, is inapposite in reviewing the scope of authority granted to the Idaho Board of 
Corrections under Idaho law. Compare with Olmos, 2013 WL4602517, at *6 (finding the plaintiff's 
reliance on Smith in challenging charges to inmates in the custody of the Arizona Department of 
Corrections based on the absence of express statutory authority was misplaced because the Florida 
court relied on the language of a Florida statute and Florida case law interpreting that statute, which 
was not the law in A.rizona). By statute and constitutional provision, the Idaho Board of Correction 
is vested with the power to control, direct and manage Idaho's correctional facilities. See Idaho 
Const. Art. X, Sec. 5; LC. §20-201A; LC. §20-209. Idaho Code §20-212 is not the sole source of the 
Board of Correction's authority, as suggested by Plaintiff. "The Board ultimately derives its powers 
from article 10, §5 of the Idaho Constitution." Mellinger, 114 Idaho at 499, 757 P.2d at 1218. 
Moreover, unlike Florida's statute, Idaho's statutory scheme pertaining to the IDOC is void of 
specific provisions that would have the effect oflimiting its authority to make monetary assessments 
against inmates. 
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The BOC has been granted broad authority to control, direct, manage and govern Idaho's 
correctional facilities, which inherently encompasses the power to establish institutional programs 
and services to inmates and to develop methods for implementing the same. Unlike in Smith, such 
power is not curtailed by Idaho Code §20-225, which expressiy mentions monetary assessments, as 
the fee authorized by that provision is entirely distinguishable from the fees at issue in the instant 
case. The current version ofldaho Code §20-225 provides: 
Any person under state probation or parole supervision shall be required to contribute 
not more than seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per month as determined by the board of 
correction. Costs of supervision are the direct and indirect costs incurred by the 
department of correction to supervise probationers and parolees, including tests to 
determine drug and alcohol use, books and written materials to support rehabilitation 
efforts, and monitoring of physical location through the use of technology. Any 
failure to pay such contribution shall constitute grounds for the revocation of 
probation by the court or the revocation of parole by the commission for pardons and 
parole. The division of probation and parole in the department of correction may 
exempt a person from the payment of all or any part of the foregoing contribution if 
it finds any of the following factors to exist: 
(1) The offender has diligently attempted but been unable to obtain employment. 
(2) The offender has a disability affecting employment, as determined by a physical, 
psychological or psychiatric examination acceptable to the division of probation and 
parole. 
Money collected as a fee for services will be placed in the probation and parole 
receipts revenue fund, which is hereby created in the dedicated fund in the state 
treasury, and utilized to provide supervision for clients. Moneys in the probation and 
parole receipts revenue fund may be expended only after appropriation by the 
legislature. This section shall not restrict the court from ordering the payment of 
other costs and fees that, by law, may be imposed on persons who have been found 
guilty of or have pled guilty to a criminal offense, including those who have been 
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placed on probation or parole. 
The plain language ofidaho Code §20-225 reveals a number offeatures that differentiate the 
cost of supervision fee from the fees at issue in the instant case. First, it is significant that Idaho Code 
§20-225 relates to collecting fees from parolees and probationers who are out in the community and 
not residing in an IDOC correctional facility. Though the Board is charged with supervising parolees 
and probationers under Idaho Code §20-219, its control over them is attenuated by virtue of their 
status. Moreover, Idaho Code §20-225 makes payment for supervision mandatory: parolees and 
probationers must pay for their cost of supervision unless they are exempt. Otherwise, it is doubtful 
that parolees or probationers would voluntarily agree to contribute money for their supervision. In 
contrast, the fees challenged by Plaintiff are charged to inmates residing at IDOC facilities based 
upon their voluntary decisions on how to spend their money. If an inmate does not wish to pay the 
telephone or commissary commission or medical co-pay or photocopy fees, he can choose not to 
make phone calls, purchase commissary items, make photocopies, or obtain medical services. Idaho 
Code §20-225 also provides consequences for a failure to pay the cost of supervision fee, i.e. 
revocation of probation or parole. \Vithout Idaho Code §20-225 the BOC wouid have iittie recourse 
against a parolee or probationer who refused to make his monthly COS payment. While IDOC 
policies and procedures, such as the ones imposing the subject fees, establish an IDOC-required 
course of action to follow, they do not have the force and effect of law and no cause of action can 
he based on the same. \Vith respect to the fees at issue in this case, non-payment is not a concern as 
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such fees are deducted from an inmate's account once the inmate utilizes the subject services. 
Finally, Idaho Code §20-225 created a dedicated probation and parole receipts revenue fund for 
moneys collected as costs of supervision. The fees at issue in this case, on the other hand, are 
deposited in the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund. 
The legislative history of Idaho Code §20-225 helps further explain why the cost of 
supervision fee is set forth in statute despite the Board's implied authority to charge user fees. The 
Statement of Purpose relating to the 1984 amendment to Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho Code adding 
Idaho Code §20-225 (S.B. 1224) to provide that a person under probation or parole supervision shall 
be required to contribute money for his supervision states: 
The purpose of this legislation is to help offset some of the cost to the taxpayer of 
supervising adult felons and to help develop responsibility on the part of the offender. 
Current caseload sizes make it impossible to supervise felons as we feel they should 
be and the community expects. 
The minutes of the Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee relating to the amendment are 
particularly enlightening: 
SB1224 RELATING TO THE PAYMENT FOR PROBATION OR PAROLE 
SERVICES 
Al Murphy from the Department of Corrections spoke on the 
proposed legislation. The bill would amend Chapter 2, Title 20, Idaho 
Code by the addition of a new section 20-225 to provide that a person 
under probation or parole supervision shall be required to contribute 
money for his supervision, i{not to provide for consequences. to also 
provide exemptions for contributing money. The bill, if passed, would 
create the probation and parole receipts account in a Dedicated 
Fund. 
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Director Murphy explained that the parolee, under supervision, would 
be required to contribute a set amount per month. In collecting these 
fees, a major purpose would be to hire new probation and parole 
officers to start a program of supervision of the paroled 24 hours a 
day, thus allowing the Department to provide an alternative to 
incarceration for many inmates. 
Representative McDermott quested the need for a dedicated fund; 
was it to avoid going before the JF AC. 
Representative Murphy responded by stating partially, because the 
Department does not want to start collecting fees, then having their 
appropriations cut by the amount of fees they collect. Mr. Murphy 
went on to explain that the Department would like to get funded at the 
same amount as present, but to let the Department keep the fees to 
increase the services. 
Minutes of the Meeting of the Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee, March 13, 1984 
( emphasis added). 
This context confirms that Idaho Code §20-225 is not simply authorization for the IDOC to 
impose a fee but was intended to provide consequences for non-payment of the cost of supervision, 
provide exemptions for contributing money and establish a dedicated fund to deposit the moneys 
collected in order to allow the IDOC to implement an intensive supervision program. Thus, under 
these circumstances, the presence of specific statutof'J authority relating to payment for probation 
or parole services does not indicate that the IDOC lacks authority to charge user fees in relation to 
services rendered to inmates housed at IDOC facilities. 
Thus, reading all of the constitutional and statutory provisions together and recognizing that 
the supervision and maintenance of prisons in the State ofidaho is a function of the executive branch 
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of the government, specifically the Board of Correction, it is clear that the IDOC policies and 
procedures at issue do not violate the separation of powers between the executive and legislative 
branches of the state government pursuant to Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section 1, and the 
District Court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs claims in this regard. 
4. The District Court Correctly Determined That The Legislature Contemplated 
That Penal Institutions May Sell Goods and Services and Expend the Funds 
Arising From the Sale of the Same for the Maintenance, Use and Support of the 
Institution. 
As set forth above, in light of the clear grant of authority to the BOC to control and manage 
Idaho's correctional facilities and to provide for the care and maintenance of all prisoners in its 
custody, it cannot be said that Defendants infringed upon the province of the Legislature in 
developing procedures related to the provision of institutional programs, activities and services to 
inmates, i.e. telephone services, commissary services, medical services and photocopy services. The 
power to impose the fees at issue, including the medical co-pay fee, the photocopying fee, the 
telephone commissions and the commissary commissions, can be reasonably implied from a 
consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole, Chapter Title 20, Idaho Code, because the fees 
relate to the operations of the IDOC and the administration of programs within the JDOC. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff's reliance and arguments relating to the applicability ofldaho Code §67-3611 
and alleged burdens thereunder are misplaced and inapposite; quite simply, the authority for the 
charging of telephone and commissary commissions is not limited to Idaho Code §67-3611. 
That provision does affirm that the Legislature contemplated that state institutions, including 
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penal institutions, may sell goods and services and expend the funds arising from the sale of the 
same for the maintenance, use and support of said institution. Idaho Code §67-3611 is entitled 
"Expenditure of funds from sale of services, rentals or sale of products by state institutions," and 
states: 
All state institutions, educational, charitable, penal and otherwise, shall be allowed 
to expend the funds arising from the sale of services, rentals of personal property, 
stock, farm or garden produce, or other goods, or article produced within or by the 
institution, for the maintenance, use and support of said institution, without reducing 
the amount of the appropriations made to such institutions; all such sums received 
shall be deposited with the state treasurer and it is hereby made the duty of the state 
controller and the state treasurer to enter deposits so received in the general fund of 
the state, and the state controller shall add the deposits so received to the 
appropriations made to such institutions severally; and the sums of money so 
received are hereby appropriated from the general fund of the state ofldaho for the 
maintenance, use and support of the institution by which the same are so received; 
and the said moneys shall be expended for the use and support of such institution for 
which the same were deposited, and shall be audited and accounted for as other 
appropriations to the said institution are. 
Based on the language of the statute, the District Court found that the commissions charged to 
inmates for the voluntary purchases of telephone time and commissary goods are funds arising from 
the sale of goods or services pursuant to Idaho Code §67-3611. (R, p. 00515, LL. 16-19.) Plaintiff~ 
however, argues, inter alia, that the statute does not apply because these items were not "produced 
within or by the institution." Plaintiffs reliance on this phrase is misplaced. The pertinent section 
states: "All state institutions, educational, charitable, penal and otherwise, shall be allowed to expend 
the funds arising from the sale of services, rentals of personal property, stock, farm or garden 
produce, or other goods, or article produced within or by the institution, for the maintenance, use 
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and support of said institution ... " LC. §67-3611 (emphasis added). Based on the plain language, 
and considering the placement of comas, the District Court found that the phrase "produced within 
or by the institution" only modified the word "article," not every item on the list as argued by 
Plaintiff (R, p. 000731, LL 2-19.) Accordingly, the District Court con-ectly found that goods or 
services do not have to be "produced within or by the institution" in order for Idaho Code §67-3611 
to apply (R, p. 000731, LL. 17-19), and that telephone and commissary commissions are authorized 
pursuant to Idaho Code §67-3611. (R, pp. 000515-516, LL. 24, 1-2.) 
Plaintiff is essentially challenging the appropriation of funds by Idaho's Legislature. It is 
undisputed that any commissions charged to inmates for the voluntary purchases of telephone time 
and commissary goods are ultimately appropriated back to the IDOC for IDOC use. (R, p. 000316-
318; R, p. 000566-567.) Appropriation acts establishing annual agency operating budgets are law, 
and the limits of those budgets cannot be exceeded. (R, p. 000566 at 16.) See also Idaho Code §67-
3516 (1) ("Appropriation acts when passed by the legislature of the state ofldaho, and spending 
authority made thereunder, whether the appropriation is fixed or continuing, are fixed budgets 
beyond which state officers, departments, bureaus and institutions may not expend."). "A legislative 
act is presumed to be constitutional and all reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality must be 
resolved in favor of its validity." Rich, 81 Idaho at 316-17, 341 P.2d at 435. Plaintiffhas not made 
a showing that the appropriation acts establishing the IDOC's annual operating budgets are 
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unconstitutional and in absence of a clear showing of invalidity the Court must uphold the 
constitutionality of the same. See 
That the commissions charged to inmates for the voluntary purchases of telephone time and 
commissary goods are deposited in the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund, as opposed to the General 
Fund, in no way indicates that these commissions are not legislatively authorized. To the contrary, 
the Miscellaneous Revenue Fund makes up part of the annual budget appropriated by the Legislature 
for the operation of the state correctional system. (R, p. 000316 at ,Il 4; R, p. 000566 at ,I8.) Thus, 
the funds collected from the telephone and commissary commissions, deposited in the state treasury 
and appropriated back to IDOC, are legislatively authorized through the appropriations process and 
cannot be said to run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. Plaintiffs focus on technicalities 
over substance is even more unavailing when one considers that Idaho Code §67-3611 was adopted 
in 1945 and that there have been no substantive amendments to the statute since that time. 6 One 
could assume that there have been changes to state budgetary and accounting processes and 
procedures since 1945 that may not be reflected in every provision of Idaho Code. Moreover, the 
District Court correctiy found that Idaho Code §67-3611 explicitly provides that it is the duty of the 
state controller and the state treasurer, not Defendants, to enter deposits so received in the general 
fund of the state. (R, pp. 000731-732, LL. 24, 1-2.) Plaintiff did not set forth any authority that stands 
6The statute was amended in 1994 to reflect proper nomenclature, changing the name of state auditor 
to state controller. See S.L. 1994, ch. 180, §215. 
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for the proposition that any alleged failure of the state controller and state treasurer to enter the 
deposits in the General Fund prohibits the Defendants from collecting such funds. (R, p. 000732, LL. 
7-11.) 
What matters for purposes of the instant analysis is that Idaho Code §67-361 I plainly 
contemplates that state institutions, including penal institutions, may sell goods and services and 
expend the funds arising from the sale of the same for the maintenance, use and support of said 
institution. Again, there is no dispute that the telephone and commissary commissions challenged 
by Plaintiff are deposited in the state treasury before they are appropriated back to the IDOC each 
year as part of its annual budget from the Idaho Legislature. 
Plaintiffs argument relating to Idaho Code §67-3602 is equally unpersuasive as that statute 
in no way indicates that telephone and commissar/ commissions are legislatively unauthorized. 
Idaho Code §67-3602 provides: 
No portion of any appropriation made for expenses other than salaries and wages 
shall be expended in payment of salaiies and wages; but with the consent of the state 
board of examiners, any portion of any appropriation made for the payment of 
salaries and wages may be expended for other expenses of the particular office or 
institution for which it is appropriated. 
Plaintiff has not set forth any evidence that the IDOC is expending the funds appropriated to it in a 
manner inconsistent with that contemplated by the Legislature. Moreover, the District Court 
correctly found that the subject matter of Plaintiffs Civil Complaint is what he alleges to be the 
illegal raising of revenue, and not the manner in which allegedly illegally raised revenue is spent. 
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(R, p. 000732, LL 14-16.) Nor for that matter has Plaintiff established that he would have standing 
to make such a claim. Plaintiff did not set forth any authority that stands for the proposition that an 
allegedly improper expenditure of revenue once raised prohibits Defendants from raising such 
revenue in the future. (R, p. 000732, LL 16-19.) Ultimately, this case involves Plaintiffs claims 
regarding the raising of revenue and there are no claims alleged in the instant case involving the 
manner in which revenue is spent once raised. In light of the same, Plaintiffs reliance on Idaho Code 
§67-3602 is misplaced. 
D. DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL. 
Defendants respectfully request the Court award attorney fees and costs incurred for this 
appeal. This request is based on Idaho Appellate Rules 3 5(b )( 5), 40, and 41 and Idaho Code § § 12-
121 and 3 l-3220A(l6). 
1. Defendants Are Entitled to an Award of Costs on Appeal. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 40 states that costs ''shall be allowed as a matter of course to the 
prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." Defendants are unaware 
of any other provision oflaw that would forbid their recovery of costs should they prevail on appeal. 
Therefore, Defendants respectfully request this Court award their costs as the prevailing party. 
2. Defendants Are Entitled to an Award of Attornev Fees on Appeal. 
An award of attorney fees may be granted under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate 
Rule 41 to the prevailing party, and such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the 
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abiding belief that the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Rendon 
v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). Likewise, 
Idaho Code §31-3220A(16)(b) provides a basis for an award of costs and attorney's fees on appeal 
in actions brought by plisoners if the comi finds that the action or any part of the action is frivolous 
or malicious. 
It is well established that the State Board of Correction is charged with the control, direction, 
and management of the state penitentiary, and the care and maintenance of all prisoners. This entire 
case stems from Plaintiffs voluntary decisions on how to spend his money as a prisoner in the 
custody of the IDOC. Plaintiff has made his own decisions to purchase commissary items, to make 
telephone calls, to photocopy documents, and to obtain medical services. In exchange for his money, 
Plaintiff has received goods and the value of services rendered. Requiring Plaintiff to make 
economic decisions about how to spend his money merely places him in a position similar to that 
faced by those whose basic costs of living are not paid by the state. Thus, Plaintiff's claims are 
frivolous and/or unreasonable, and Defendants have been forced to defend this appeal and incur 
attorney fees. On these grounds, Defendants request an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The District Court was correct in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. As such, the Decisions and Judgment of 
the District Court should be affirmed. 
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